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Abstract Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value
depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements.
I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instru-
mentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of
deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the
participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relation-
ships of mutual accountability that characterize appropriately conducted deliberation.
I will argue that it only comes into view from the second-person standpoint. I shall
explain what the second-person standpoint in the epistemic context entails and how
it compares to Stephen Darwall’s interpretation of the second-person standpoint in
ethics.
Keywords Social epistemology · Proceduralism · Second-person standpoint
1 Introduction
An important question one can ask about collective deliberation is whether it increases
or decreases the accuracy of the beliefs of the participants. But this instrumental
approach, which only looks at the outcome of deliberation, does not exhaustively
account for the epistemic value that deliberation might have. My aim in this paper is
to show that collective deliberation may also have procedural epistemic value. The idea
that collective deliberation has procedural value is familiar from the practical context.
The procedural value of practical deliberation is typically captured in terms of the
relationships of reciprocity (Rawls 1993), mutual accountability (Darwall 2006), or
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equal respect (Larmore 2008) that characterize—appropriately conducted—collective
deliberation. I shall draw an analogy between the practical case and the epistemic case
and argue that, under certain circumstances, deliberation has procedural epistemic
value.
My argument links the procedural epistemic value of deliberation to the—second-
personal—notion of relationships of mutual accountability among epistemic agents.
The second-person standpoint has received powerful advocacy by Stephen Darwall in
his recent book with that title. The main claim his book defends is that moral reasons,
as a subcategory of practical reasons, are irreducibly second-personal. They stem from
relationships of mutual accountability between persons who treat each other as self-
originating sources of valid claims. Darwall also maintains that while practical reasons
can be irreducibly second-personal, epistemic reasons cannot. What one has reason
to believe depends on truth. Since truth is third-personal, Darwall argues, epistemic
reasons are fundamentally third-personal.
I think this dichotomy overstates the case. I will show that the second-person stand-
point is relevant not just in the practical context but in the epistemic context as well.
In certain circumstances, deliberation gives rise to second-personal epistemic reasons.
The relevant circumstances arise when deliberation is characterized by disagreements
among epistemic peers.1 In a disagreement among peers, each party needs to consider
whether they can justifiably stick to their guns or whether it is appropriate that they
adjust their beliefs in the direction of the other. It turns out not only that there are
situations in which it is appropriate that they both adjust their beliefs in direction of
the other, but also that the reason that they have to do so is to some extent indepen-
dent of the subject matter of their deliberation. What this shows is that accuracy of
belief is not the only source of epistemic reasons. Some form of mutual accountability
between the deliberative parties becomes an additional factor. I call this thesis about
the epistemic value of deliberation the accountability thesis.
Mutual accountability between epistemic peers is a procedural value and an appro-
priate account of mutual accountability invokes the second-person standpoint. The
second-person standpoint thus helps us understand how the epistemic value of delib-
eration may not merely be instrumental but procedural as well.
2 Deliberation and disagreements
Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and is, at least in part, a tool to eval-
uate such disagreements. This is evident in a wide range of deliberative contexts—e.g.
in science, in politics, or in any group endeavour such as committee work in public or
private associations and organizations. What characterizes a disagreement is that the
parties hold mutually incompatible beliefs. Such disagreements can occur for many
reasons. Sometimes, not all parties have considered all the available facts. Sometimes,
one party to the disagreement has misinterpreted the evidence or drawn the wrong
1 I shall comment later, in Sect. 2, on what I mean by epistemic peers. I shall work with a very weak notion
of epistemic peers, one that can be applied to large-scale collective deliberation as it occurs in a democratic
context.
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conclusions from it. In this case, well-functioning deliberation may serve as an instru-
ment to demonstrate the mistake of the wrong party and lead to an agreement on the
correct belief. Once the disagreement has been eliminated in this way, deliberation
ends. But the opposite can happen as well, of course. Dysfunctional deliberation may
end in a consensus on the wrong conclusion. The literature on group polarization, for
example, documents such dysfunctional deliberative dynamics (e.g. Sunstein 2002).
I want to focus on a special case of deliberation here, namely the case of delib-
eration among parties who consider each other epistemic peers. An epistemic peer
is someone who you take to be equally likely to make a mistake (Elga 2007). This
is a very weak definition of what it means to be a peer, since it only takes the form
of an all-things-considered criterion and doesn’t invoke any input conditions such as
equal formal qualifications or equal computational abilities, etc. On this definition of
peers, deliberation among parties who consider each other peers can occur not just in
contexts of academic or expert inquiry, but in any small or large social collective, for
example on issues which are too wide-ranging and complex for anyone to count as an
expert, or when relevant information is dispersed across all deliberative parties.
While you judge your peers, by definition, to be equally likely to make a mistake in
a particular situation, this doesn’t mean that two peers always perform equally well.
Sometimes you have information about the circumstances of the disagreement that
makes it appropriate for you to discount their judgment to a certain extent. For exam-
ple, of two scientific colleagues who compare their different conclusions about the
validity of a hypothesis, one may have double-checked the data and the calculations
and asked an assistant to do the same while the other was pressed for time and admits
that he only ran what he was given through an off-the-peg computer programme. In
a context of social deliberation, imagine a case of committee work, even though all
participants consider each other to be equally able to take up the available evidence,
some may have carefully thought about the implications of the evidence presented and
this is evident from how they argue in support of their views, others respond with a gut
reaction. But what is important is that, absent higher-order evidence which suggests
that they can dismiss the views of their peers altogether, peers need to consider the
implications of their disagreement. The thought is that the fact that someone who you
ex ante regarded as a peer disagrees with you is not sufficient ground to dismiss his
or her belief.
What is the rational response for someone who realizes that a person she considers
an epistemic peer disagrees with her? Is it possible for epistemic peers to have a rea-
sonable disagreement or does rationality force them to converge towards a particular
doxastic attitude? Is any revision of one’s initial beliefs required?
One way to answer the last question negatively is by arguing that what justifies some-
one’s belief is their response to the available evidence and by denying that information
about the beliefs of peers carries any epistemic weight.2 If the available evidence is
such that two persons, including two peers, can justifiably form incompatible beliefs,
no adjustment is required. On this view—sometimes called the Steadfast View of
2 I can’t get into a discussion here of what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the justification
of belief. I’m simply bracketing this question and argue from the premise that there is some set of such
conditions that can be met.
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disagreements—the issue of whether the beliefs of the two parties are justified can be
dissociated from the fact that they disagree.3 The consequence is that reasonable dis-
agreements are possible and the parties to the disagreement are not rationally required
to give any weight to each other’s beliefs.4 If two peers hold conflicting but permis-
sible views—say p with credence 0.2 and p with credence 0.8—and if each has good
epistemic reasons to regard their original belief as justified, they may simply end up
agreeing to disagree.
If this were the correct view of disagreements among peers, the case for the proce-
dural epistemic value of collective deliberation is closed from the start. If epistemic
value only depended on how epistemic agents, unilaterally, respond to the available
evidence, it would imply that deliberation in itself has no epistemic import. If delibera-
tion itself is to have a hold on the deliberating parties, it must be because an alternative
account of disagreements among peers is possible and indeed more plausible.
As a first step towards an account that explains the epistemic significance of delib-
eration itself, consider the case where the available evidence warrants a unique belief.
Suppose, after carefully considering this evidence, two epistemic peers hold mutually
incompatible beliefs. If the Uniqueness Thesis is true, i.e. if the body of evidence
warrants a unique belief, and if the parties to a disagreement have full access to this
body of evidence, then they cannot both be justified to hold the beliefs they do. The
evidence will warrant p with a certain credence and so at least one of them holds an
incorrect belief.
The Uniqueness Thesis implies that there is epistemic content in the comparison
of the beliefs of epistemic peers. If I realize that someone I consider a peer holds a
different belief from the one that I assumed was warranted by the available evidence
and absent independent information about the performance of my peer, Uniqueness
forces me to ask the question of who is right. Since we cannot both be right, the com-
parison warrants a response. This brings me into a deliberative context with my peer
and vice versa.
If we grant Uniqueness, the rational response to a disagreement between two per-
sons who consider each other epistemic peers and have fully disclosed the evidence
available to them is to reduce confidence in their original beliefs. How much their
confidence should be reduced depends on additional considerations, especially con-
siderations about the relative weights that it is rational to attribute (i) to one’s own
ability to come to the correct conclusion and (ii) to the fact that someone one has
reason to regard as a peer has come to a different conclusion.
Take the case in which two peers find that they hold diametrically opposed views—
p and not p. Assume also that they have independent information that lets them con-
sider each other as peers and that suggests that each is just as likely to perform well.5
3 The label is from Christensen (2009, 2011); but see Kelly (2005) for the view itself.
4 (Kelly, 2010, p. 116) has a very clear articulation of this view. On what he calls the “symmetrical no
independent weight view”, there are at least some cases of peer disagreement in which “both parties to the
dispute might be perfectly reasonable even if neither gives any weight at all to the opinion of the other.”
5 On independence, see Christensen (2011, p. 1): “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s
expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should
do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P.”
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In this case, suspending belief is the rational response for each. (ii) becomes decisive
in this case, as there is no reason to give more weight to one’s own original belief than
to the belief of the peer. What has come to be called the Equal Weight View (Elga
2007) focuses on this case to claim that reasonable disagreements are not possible.
On this view, absent any further information, the rational response to a disagreement
between peers is for each to meet the other halfway and thus to dissolve the original
disagreement. As long as Uniqueness holds and each has access to the same body of
evidence, two peers who are were likely to perform well cannot both be justified to
hold the original beliefs they do and so a reasonable disagreement between them is
not possible. On this view, rational deliberation between peers forces them to reach
an agreement.
The Equal Weight View is a special case of a broader position called the Concilia-
tory View (Elga 2010; Christensen 2011). On the Conciliatory View of peer disagree-
ments, you are required to give some weight—but not necessarily equal weight—to
the belief of your peer. It makes room for the possibility that, in spite of the informa-
tion that the other party in the disagreement is a peer, you also have reason to give
some extra weight to your own belief—not because it’s your own, but because of
evidence you have about your own performance. There may even be clear cases in
which you are entitled to discount the belief of your peer completely, say because only
you, but not your peer, cross-checked several sources or because your peer came to
a result that is obviously impossible (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007). But when inde-
pendent information about the ability and willingness of your peer to perform well
gives you good reasons to believe that there is a positive probability that your peer
is correct, you will be required to move some distance towards the belief of your
peer.
But even without upholding Uniqueness, it is possible to argue for the need to
revise one’s belief in response to a peer disagreement. On Thomas Kelly’s revised
version of the Steadfast View—he calls it the Total Evidence View—a disagreement
with a peer is treated as a piece of—higher-order—evidence. On this view, “what it
is reasonable to believe depends on both the original, first-order evidence as well as
on the higher-order evidence that is afforded by the fact that one’s peers believe as
they do” (Kelly 2010, p. 142). Just like you have reason to adjust your original belief
after you double-check a mental math exercise on your calculator and come up with
a different result, so you have reason to adjust your belief if you find yourself in a
disagreement with a peer. This holds independently of whether the evidence you get
from the calculator or the disagreement with the peer is conducive to accuracy or
misleading.
The Total Evidence View and the Conciliatory View come apart with regard to
how they explain the epistemic role that disagreement with a peer plays. According
to the Total Evidence View, if the disagreement receives any weight, it is as a piece
of evidence that a rational epistemic agent needs to consider together with the other
available evidence. On the Conciliatory View, by contrast, the disagreement gives you
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a reason to revise your belief that is of a different kind than the reasons that you had
to form your original belief.6
I can’t fully assess the debate here, and I don’t need to as both sides accept that, in
some cases of peer disagreement, you have reason to adjust your belief in direction
of your peer (and vice versa). But I have some sympathies for the line that the Con-
ciliatorists take. Here is why. What makes it plausible to claim that a disagreement
with a peer gives you epistemic reasons of a different kind than those that led you
to your original belief is our fallibility as epistemic agents. However hard we try to
appropriately respond to the evidence we have, we often fail. We share this predic-
ament with our peers and so we all have reason not just to try and respond to the
evidence in the best way we can but also, under some circumstances at least, to give
weight to the belief of a peer. David Christensen (2011, p. 33) expresses the thought
well: “Rationality requires that I take seriously evidence of my own possible cognitive
malfunction in arriving at my beliefs. But insofar as I’m willing to do this, I must
evaluate evidence for that possibility in a way that is (at least somewhat) independent
of some of my reasoning.”7
The upshot of this discussion is that in some circumstances there are good epistemic
reasons for epistemic peers to be responsible towards each other’s claims and to con-
sider some revision of their original beliefs on the basis of these claims. Call this the
accountability thesis about the epistemic value of deliberation. Both the Total Evidence
View and the Conciliatory View are compatible with the accountability thesis. But the
latter is also compatible with a stronger version of it. On the Total Evidence View, you
are accountable to the (higher-order) evidence that you get from the fact that some-
one you take to be a peer disagrees with you together with the pieces of (first-order)
evidence that you have. On the Conciliatory View, you have reason to respond to the
disagreement with a peer independently of the first-order evidence you had for your
original view. Your accountability thus involves the standing that you attribute to your
peer in a more immediate sense.
The epistemic reasons that are generated in these circumstances are second-per-
sonal: it is not the first-order evidence about the object considered but the claim of your
peer that gives you a reason to adjust your original belief. To flesh out the account-
ability thesis, I now want to turn to a discussion of the second-person standpoint and
its interpretation in the epistemic context.
6 In other words, what is at stake is the independence condition that Conciliatorists uphold and that I’ve
mentioned in footnote 5 above; see Christensen (2011) for this diagnosis of the debate.
7 Our fallibility is compounded by the fact that disagreements might also arise from the fact that the evidence
we have for our beliefs is not fully transparent to us. So far, I’ve only focused on cases in which both parties
to the disagreement have been able to fully disclose the evidence that they have for the beliefs they hold.
But problems with fully disclosing the relevant evidence suggest yet another take on disagreements among
peers, one that is particularly relevant for deliberation about complex social problems. I’ve argued for this
view, which I call the Opacity View, in Peter (unpublished), drawing on contributions by Goldman (2010)
and Sosa (2010). But since the Opacity View, as I understand it, only adds to but doesn’t change the claim
I’m focusing on here—i.e. that we sometimes have reason to adjust our beliefs in direction of our peers—I
will not discuss it here.
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3 The second-person standpoint
As I understand Darwall’s idea, the second-person standpoint in the context of moral
reasons is a web of four concepts—reason, claim, practical authority, and account-
ability—in which each entails the others. Someone’s valid claim gives someone else a
reason to act accordingly. My claim, for example, that you move your foot from on top
of mine, gives you a reason to do so. And it does so because we mutually acknowledge
our authority in cases like that, i.e. I have a right to make claims of this sort on you
(and vice versa).
This web characterizes the relationship between moral agents and exhaustively
explains, according to Darwall, the normative grip of each of the component concepts.
What is distinctive about the second-person standpoint is that it locates the source
of normativity in the relationship between moral agents—not in individuals as such
(first-person standpoint) and not outside of their relationship (third-person standpoint).
The divisions that Darwall draws between the second- and third-person standpoints,
on the one hand, and, on the other, between the second- and first-person standpoints
are not equally sharp. The significance of the second-personal standpoint in morality
is linked to a denial of a third-personal source of moral normativity. So the distinc-
tion between the second- and the third-personal standpoint in ethics is, on Darwall’s
account, a sharp one. First-personal considerations, by contrast, are part of the second-
personal standpoint (Pauer-Studer 2010). It is, after all, me who makes certain claims.
But this doesn’t imply that the second-person standpoint reduces to the first-person
standpoint. Instead, the second-person standpoint serves to qualify first-personal con-
siderations. It identifies which such considerations have moral weight or, in other
words, what we can validly claim from each other.
In parallel with the distinction between the second- and the third-personal stand-
point, Darwall also sets up a dichotomy between practical reasons on the one hand and
epistemic reasons on the other. He argues that while some of our practical reasons,
specifically, our moral reasons, are irreducibly second-personal, in the sense that they
do not make reference to a third-personal source of normativity, epistemic reasons are
not. In the epistemic case, it is truth that is reason-giving. But truth is third-personal,
Darwall argues, and so epistemic reasons are fundamentally third-personal.
Underlying this dichotomy between moral and epistemic reasons are two possible
sources of authority. Darwall explains the thought with a reference to Hobbes’ distinc-
tion between “command” and “counsel”.8 With a command, the source of authority is
in someone else’s will. With counsel, the source of authority lies in an object outside
of the relationship between the person in authority and the person who is account-
able. Epistemic reasons, in Darwall’s view, are always a form of counsel; they never
simply arise from a claim someone else makes and so never take the form of com-
mand. In the moral case, by contrast, when people recognize and respect each other
as self-originating sources of valid claims (Darwall 2006, p. 21), practical authority
will take the form of command. Authority, in this case, doesn’t derive from something
8 As Hobbes puts it, “counsel is a precept, in which the reason of my obeying is taken from the thing itself
which is advised; but command is a precept, in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the
commander” (Hobbes De Cive, quoted in Darwall 2006, p. 12, footnote 25).
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outside of the relationship between the two agents. It resides entirely in the relation-
ship between people. As Darwall puts it, “when you demand that someone move his
foot from on top of yours, you presuppose an irreducibly second-personal standing to
address this second-personal reason. . . . [This] standing itself neither is, nor simply
follows from, any form of third-personal or epistemic authority” (Darwall 2006, p. 13).
Darwall grants that second-personal considerations may have a place in epistemic
contexts as well, for example in cases of testimony. But because the authority of the
testifier is third-personal—it depends on whether or not the testifier has appropriately
responded to the evidence he or she has—my second-personal reason to believe what
a testifier tells me is not entirely contained in our relationship. On his view, episte-
mic reasons can only be derivatively second-personal. The authority to address moral
claims to others, by contrast, is, in Darwall’s view, “fundamentally second-personal”
(ibid.).
Is this dichotomy between second-personal practical reasons and third-personal
epistemic reasons plausible? McMyler (2011, p. 146ff) has recently argued that epi-
stemic reasons, too, can be irreducibly second-personal. Here is how he adapts the
distinction between second and third-personal reasons to the epistemic case: “a sec-
ond-personal reason for belief is a consideration that justifies a belief in virtue of
interpersonal relations of authority and responsibility existing between an addresser
and an addressee, and a third-personal reason for belief is a consideration that justifies
a belief but not in virtue of such interpersonal relations.” He follows Darwall in focus-
ing on the case of testimony, but then argues that the authority of the testifier takes
the form of command, not counsel. In his terminology, an irreducible second-personal
reason to believe that p is one that derives from the testifier testifying that p, just like
a second-personal moral reason to phi derives from the claim someone has on us to
phi. On his terminology, irreducibly second personal reason are those that necessarily
involve a second epistemic agent.
I share McMyler’s view that the dichotomy between second-personal practical
reasons and third-personal epistemic reasons that Darwall sets up is too stark. But
McMyler’s proposal for how to dissolve the dichotomy is not satisfactory. This is so
for two reasons. The first is that his disagreement with Darwall about whether or not
there are irreducibly second-personal epistemic reasons is primarily semantic. Darwall
defines irreducibly second-personal reasons as those which have their source entirely
within relationships of mutual accountability. They arise from second-personal author-
ity. His claim that epistemic reasons cannot be irreducibly second-personal is based on
the further claims that truth is third-personal and that the second-person standpoint is
thus not sufficient to account for epistemic reasons. McMyler defines irreducibly sec-
ond-personal reasons more weakly as reasons which necessarily (but not sufficiently)
involve a second-personal element. So he grants to Darwall that it is the third-personal
epistemic authority of the testifier that gives the addressee the reason to believe. But
in his terminology, this doesn’t imply that epistemic reasons derived from testimony
are not irreducibly second-personal.
To dissolve the dichotomy between the epistemic case and the practical case McMy-
ler then introduces the further claim that both epistemic and practical reasons ultimately
bottom out in third-personal reasons (McMyler 2011, p. 151). This substantive part of
the argument against the dichotomy between moral and epistemic reasons rests on a
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denial of second-personal practical authority. On Myler’s view, practical authority is,
like epistemic authority, ultimately third-personal. If this were correct, then Darwall’s
dichotomy would indeed collapse.
But I don’t find this part of the argument satisfactory either. There may be cases in
which practical authority is, indeed, correctly thought of as third-personal. But that
doesn’t imply that practical authority always is. A weaker claim than the one that Dar-
wall makes still goes through. If there are at least some cases in which it is appropriate
that persons treat each other as self-originating sources of valid moral claims, then
there is second-personal authority and the way in which Darwall draws the distinction
between reducibly and irreducibly second-personal reasons still makes sense.
Be this as it may. In what follows, I will simply accept Darwall’s claim that there
are irreducibly second-personal reasons, in the sense that he defines them. I will also
agree with Darwall that epistemic reasons that derive—even indirectly—from third-
personal authority, are not irreducibly second-personal. But I will show in the next
section that there is such a thing as second-personal epistemic authority and hence
that there are epistemic reasons that are irreducibly second-personal in the sense that
they stem from second-personal authority relations. Testimony is not, however, the
paradigm case for such authority relations. Deliberation among peers is.
4 Mutal accountability and second-personal epistemic authority
I’m granting that epistemic agents aim at truth and that truth is third-personal. But
it doesn’t follow from the third-personal character of truth that epistemic author-
ity is necessarily third-personal. Authority, but not truth, is fundamentally agential.
Epistemic authority is a concept that captures the right to make claims about what
ought to be believed, just like practical authority captures the right to make claims
about what ought to be done. To assume that epistemic authority is third-personal is
thus to assume that an epistemic agent’s right to make claims about what ought to
be believed is determined by third-personal truth. But that’s the assumption I want
to question. Of course, it is often the case that the right to make claims about what
ought to be believed derives directly from third-personal truth. When it is the case,
then authority is appropriately characterized from the third-personal standpoint. As
the case of testimony discussed above shows, third-personal epistemic authority may
even give rise to second-personal epistemic reasons. But what I want to argue here
is that there are cases in which epistemic authority itself is—necessarily, even if not
sufficiently—second-personal.
Above we saw that in some cases of disagreements among epistemic peers that
can arise in deliberation, the appropriate response is, for each epistemic agent, to
give (some) weight to the claims of the other. Just to recapitulate, deliberation among
peers may lead to one of the following outcomes. First, well-functioning delibera-
tion may demonstrate that at least one of them failed to appropriately take on board
relevant evidence. In this case, deliberation dissolves the disagreement. The party
who has made the mistake is rationally required to adjust his or her belief. But
if the disagreement persists, they each will have to adjust their belief in direction
of the other. Under certain circumstances, they will even have to suspend belief
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altogether and come to an agreement that neither of their original beliefs was jus-
tified.9
Epistemic authority under the circumstances of a disagreement among deliberative
parties who consider each other to be peers is not merely the fallout of them appropri-
ately responding to the available first-order evidence. To respect others as epistemic
peers, even when they disagree with you, is to acknowledge them as a source of valid
epistemic claims beyond what you came to believe to be true.
The case of deliberation among epistemic peers is located in between the practical
case that Darwall focuses on and the testimony case. In testimony, the testifier is
accountable to truth and his or her epistemic authority is third-personal. Qua this
authority, the testifier has a claim on the person to whom the testimony is addressed
and the addressee then has a second-personal reason to adjust his belief. In a disagree-
ment between peers, there is a link to third-personal truth, but the “chain of command”
doesn’t flow unidirectionally from truth to the first agent involved in deliberation and
then to the other participant. Instead, we have a case in which the epistemic agents are
mutually accountable to each other. Each has a claim to epistemic authority and each
has reason to give some weight to the claims of the other.
One might object that what is going on in theoretical deliberation between episte-
mic peers will not be a case of command, but a case of counsel, where what the parties
to the deliberation have reason to believe depends on what the deliberation is about
and not on who makes which claims. But my discussion of the case of deliberation
among peers has shown that we sometimes have epistemic reason to adjust our beliefs
in response to the claims of others. And what gives me this reason is not the object
on which deliberation focuses, but the belief of my peer. In this sense, deliberation
involves authority relationships which take the form of command.10
What the case of a deliberation about a potentially reasonable disagreement between
epistemic peers shares with the practical case is that authority—practical in one case
and epistemic in the other—is vested in the agents and each does, and should, acknowl-
edge the potential authority of the other. Where the two cases come apart is that in the
practical case, as Darwall construes it, authority is irreducibly second-personal but in
the theoretical case it is not. In the practical case, each is accountable to the other as
a self-originating source of valid claims. In the theoretical case, although each has to
acknowledge the other as a source of valid claims, the validity of their claims doesn’t
stem entirely from the relationship between the agents. Instead, there is a triangulation
between third-personal truth and the claims the agents make on each other. They are
each accountable both to each other and to the truth they both aim for. What distin-
guishes the epistemic case from Darwall’s characterization of the practical case is that
although the second-personal standpoint may be necessary to account for some forms
epistemic authority, it is not sufficient.
9 See Kelly (2010, p. 150) on how the Total Evidence View concurs with the Conciliatory View on this.
10 This holds for both the Total Evidence View and the Conciliatory View. The Total Evidence View distin-
guishes between the first-order evidence you have for the subject matter of deliberation and the higher-order
evidence you get from the fact of a disagreement with a peer. But the Conciliatory View, because of its
insistence on the independence condition, has an even better handle on the distinction between command
and counsel.
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5 The procedural epistemic value of deliberation
The case of a disagreement between epistemic peers highlights our fallibility as episte-
mic agents. It is not unusual that we make mistakes. And although we are often able to
discover our own mistakes—say by becoming aware of inconsistencies in our beliefs
or by experiencing unexpected consequences when we act based on false beliefs,
deliberation with epistemic peers is, as illustrated by scientific inquiry, an effective
means to identify our misconceptions and to highlight our uncertainties.
Deliberation has instrumental epistemic value if and only if participating in deliber-
ation—comparing evidence and opinions and responding to the evidence and opinions
of others—leads to more accurate beliefs. It has instrumental epistemic disvalue if it
hinders the formation of accurate beliefs. What characterizes the purely instrumental
approach is that it reduces the value of deliberation to its contribution to the—intrin-
sic—epistemic value of accuracy.
I don’t mean to deny the importance of the instrumentalist approach. And I’m also
granting that accuracy as defined in relation to third-personal truth is the only intrinsic
epistemic value and that a complete account of the epistemic value of deliberation
will necessarily make reference to third-personal truth. But what the circumstances
I’ve described above show, I contend, is that the purely instrumental approach doesn’t
always fully account for the epistemic value that deliberation might have. In disagree-
ment among peers, the epistemic value of deliberation no longer reduces to its value
as a means to produce accurate beliefs. As we saw, epistemic agents are sometimes
not just accountable to the truth they seek, but to each other as well. This implies that
deliberation as such, not merely its outcome, may have epistemic value.
I understand procedural value in opposition to instrumental value. Deliberation has
procedural value—epistemic or practical—if its value does not reduce to the value of
its result. What the above discussion of peer disagreement showed is that in some cases
of disagreements among peers, each has reason to move, even if it is only a tiny bit,
in the direction of the other by reducing the confidence in their original beliefs. This
is so even if it one side is—from a God’s eye point of view—correct and the other is
not. And it is not so simply because either side presents evidence that the other should
incorporate. The reason to move in each other’s direction stems from accountability
to epistemic peers.
What the accountability thesis highlights is that sometimes the procedural value
of accountability to each other is all that is left to epistemic peers who find that they
cannot agree on which belief the evidence warrants. In such cases, to be a responsible
epistemic agent is to be accountable to one’s peers in a deliberative process. Epistemic
authority, the right to make claims about what ought to be believed, is shared by the
peers and dependent on a relationship of mutual accountability. My account of the
significance of the second-person standpoint in the epistemic context thus lends itself
to the explication of the procedural epistemic value of deliberation.
Here’s how the procedural epistemic value of deliberation should be understood.
Building on Rawls (1971, p. 85), we can distinguish among three main forms that pro-
ceduralism about deliberation might take. The first is pure proceduralism. According
to pure proceduralism, the deliberative procedure is necessary and sufficient for the
value of its outcome. The outcome of deliberation has value simply because it is the
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result of this procedure. It is a distinctive feature of this form of proceduralism that
there is no procedure-independent standard that could confer value on the outcomes.
In the practical case it is possible to value deliberation in purely proceduralist fash-
ion. For example, I have argued that democratic legitimacy should be understood in
this way (Peter 2008). The thought is that a democratic decision is legitimate if and
only if it has been made through an appropriate deliberative democratic decision-
making process. So it’s only procedural features that make the outcome legitimate,
not features of the outcome of this decision-making process.
In the epistemic case, the value of deliberation is never purely procedural. Accuracy
of belief remains the only intrinsic epistemic value and plays a role in the determination
of what counts as valuable outcomes. So the epistemic value of deliberation cannot be
purely procedural. The other two forms that proceduralism might take are perfect and
imperfect proceduralism. What they have in common is that they assume that there is
a procedure-independent standard that confers value on the outcomes. According to
perfect proceduralism, a certain procedure is necessary to realize valuable outcomes
as identified by the procedure-independent standard. According to imperfect proced-
uralism, the procedure is necessary to approximate valuable outcomes. Although the
procedure may fail to reach good outcomes, it gets its value from the irreducible role
it has in approximating good outcomes.
The procedural epistemic value of deliberation takes the form of imperfect procedu-
ralism. Accuracy remains the only intrinsic epistemic value and sets a procedure-inde-
pendent standard for evaluating deliberation. But when epistemic peers find themselves
in a persistent disagreement about what counts as accurate belief, the value of their
accountability to each other, and hence of procedural features of deliberation, come
into view.
How could the procedural value of deliberation be cashed out? In other words, what
are the conditions that specify appropriate relationships of mutual epistemic account-
ability? I don’t have a full answer to this question, but the account I have given above
suggests that at least the following conditions are important: (i) respect of epistemic
equality; (ii) willingness to enter deliberation and to explicate one’s beliefs; and (iii)
uptake.11 The first condition states that deliberative parties who count each other as
peers ought to recognize each other as such. It is then not permissible to give extra
weight to one’s own beliefs simply because they are one’s own. This condition ensures
that the participants are each aware of their own fallibility and acknowledge the possi-
bility that their own beliefs may be wrong while their peers might be correct. The other
two conditions characterize a deliberative process among peers. The second condition
gets deliberation going by demanding that the participants spell out the evidence they
have—or think they have—for holding the beliefs they do. Since we assumed from
the start that the participants aim at truth and not at some other, non-epistemic goal,
this condition orients deliberation to the evaluation of the accuracy of the beliefs they
each hold.12 Uptake, finally, keeps deliberation going as it ensures that the participants
11 Although the conditions are slightly different, my thinking on these matters was much influenced by
Helen Longino’s proceduralist social epistemology—see her book The Fate of Knowledge.
12 By assuming that participants aim at truth and by ignoring the non-epistemic goals the participants might
pursue in deliberation I am, of course making a strong and very unrealistic assumption. But it is appropriate
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adequately respond to each other. It follows from the view that I have sketched that
uptake relates both to the need to respond to the evidence they each present and to the
claims they each make as such.
These conditions, however rough, are clearly all procedural conditions. They spec-
ify a relationship of mutual accountability between the deliberative parties and they
do not reduce the value of this relationship to the outcome it produces.
I accept that in many contexts, we can assess the epistemic value of deliberation in
instrumentalist fashion. These contexts are virulent when truth is the aim of delibera-
tion and is available as a standard for assessing the participants’ beliefs. The procedural
value of deliberation moves into the foreground the less access we have to such a stan-
dard and the more epistemic value depends on relationships of mutual accountability
between epistemic peers. A full theory of the epistemic value of deliberation would
have to spell out the extent to which instrumental and procedural concerns determine
the epistemic value of deliberation in different contexts. This is beyond the scope
of this paper. All I wanted to show here is that deliberation might have procedural
epistemic value.
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